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CHRISTIAN CYBORGS:  
A PLEA FOR A MODERATE TRANSHUMANISM
Benedikt Paul Göcke
Should or shouldn’t Christians endorse the transhumanist agenda of chang-
ing human nature in ways fitting to one’s needs? To answer this question, 
we first have to be clear on what precisely the thesis of transhumanism en-
tails that we are going to evaluate. Once this point is clarified, I argue that 
Christians can in principle fully endorse the transhumanist agenda because 
there is nothing in Christian faith that is in contradiction to it. In fact, given 
certain plausible moral assumptions, Christians should endorse a moderate 
enhancement of human nature. I end with a brief case study that analyses the 
theological implications of the idea of immortal Christian cyborgs. I argue 
that the existence of Christian cyborgs who know no natural death has no 
impact on the Christian hope of immortality in the presence of God.
I. What Is Transhumanism?
Bostrom1 provides a useful characterisation of the transhumanist agenda:
Transhumanism is a loosely defined movement that has developed gradu-
ally over the past two decades and can be viewed as an outgrowth of secular 
humanism and the Enlightenment. It holds that current human nature is 
improvable through the use of applied science and other rational methods, 
which may make it possible to increase human health span, extend our intel-
lectual and physical capacities, and give us increased control over our own 
mental states and moods.2
In order to define “transhumanism” in a way we can evaluate from a 
Christian point of view, this needs to be refined in four ways. First, we 
have to clarify whether transhumanism is a descriptive, predictive, or 
normative thesis. Second, we have to spell out the concept of human 
nature deployed in the formulation of transhumanism to specify what 
transhumanism wants to change and what it does not. Third, we have to 
distinguish the different possible types of change and the different means 
1Bostrom, “In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,” 55.
2Cf. Marsen, “Playing by the Rules—or Not?” 86; Bostrom, “A History of Transhumanist 
Thought,” 1–25; Tirosh-Samuelson, “Engaging Transhumanism,” 19–54; Hayles, “Wrestling 
with Transhumanism,” 215–226; Dupuy, “Cybernetics is Antihumanism,” 227–248.
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that in principle can be used to change human nature. Finally, we have to 
reflect on the very intention to change human nature.3
I.1 Transhumanism as a Normative Thesis
Humanity has reached a level of technological and scientific development 
that brings us close to being able to change human nature in ways not 
possible a few decades ago.4 As Tirosh-Samuelson says, “Technology is 
transforming human life at a faster pace than ever before. The convergence 
of nanotechnology, biotechnology, robotics, information and communi-
cation technology, and applied cognate science poses a new situation in 
which the human has become a design object.”5
This new technological situation allows for two different interpreta-
tions. On the one hand, transhumanism could be a purely descriptive or 
predictive thesis according to which human nature is improvable, or as a 
matter of fact will be improved through the use of scientific means. On the 
other hand, transhumanism could be understood as a normative demand 
according to which changing human nature through the means of science 
is morally valuable.
If transhumanism were only the descriptive or predictive assertion 
that human nature is de facto improvable, or most likely will be improved 
through the use of applied science and other rational methods, it would 
not entail any ethical claims. Transhumanism becomes ethically exciting, 
and perhaps turns into “the most dangerous idea in the world,”6 only if 
we understand it as a normative demand according to which it is morally 
valuable for us to change human nature through the use of applied science 
and other rational methods. As Walker says, “Transhumanism does not 
say that we will create posthumans; rather, it makes a moral claim: we 
ought to create posthumans.”7
I.2 Human Subjects and Human Bodies
I assume that human subjects are embodied subjects of a stream of con-
sciousness who experience themselves as autonomous and freely acting 
moral agents in the world.8 No morally acceptable interpretation of trans-
3Not every transhumanist will agree with the following specification of transhumanism. 
That there is a variety of transhumanist theses, though, is a characteristic of the transhu-
manist movement, cf. Tirosh-Samuelson, “Engaging Transhumanism,” 29.
4The idea to change human nature, of course, is as old as human cultural reflection on 
human nature itself. As Ihde says, “the desires and fantasies are ancient. Historically, they 
appear in our literatures, our fairy tales, and in our art” (“Of Which Humans Are We Post?,” 
126). 
5Tirosh-Samuelson, “Engaging Transhumanism,” 19.
6Fukuyama, “Transhumanism: The World’s Most Dangerous Idea,” 42–43.
7Walker, “Ship of Fools,” 95.
8It is matter of perennial discussion whether human subjects really are freely acting and 
moral agents or whether they only perceive themselves as such. Although it seems that 
human subjects are free acting and moral agents it is enough for the discussion of trans-
humanism to suppose that they at least experience themselves as freely acting agents. For 
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humanism entails that the agenda is one of restricting the autonomy of 
human subjects and nothing that undermines such agency could count as 
an enhancement. The reason is that being an embodied subject of a stream 
of consciousness, which at least experiences itself as a free and morally 
responsible agent in the world, is of intrinsic moral value, if not the very 
foundation of the possibility of morality itself.9
Based on this assumption, I let the expression “human nature” refer to 
whatever it is that, in suitable environmental conditions, is biologically 
responsible for the growth and ordinary functioning of an individual 
living biological organism that (a) satisfies enough of relevant biological 
features invoked by experts by which one is classified as an instance of 
homo sapiens and (b) in normal circumstances is, or develops to become, a 
moral agent in the sense defined above. In other words, I deploy the term 
“human nature” as essentially referring to the body or the genome of a 
human subject.
Consequently, I understand transhumanism to entail the moral demand 
to change the body or genome of an indiviual human subject through the 
use of applied science.
I.3 External and Internal Changes to Human Nature
I will suppose that a change of the human nature of an individual is a 
physical or biological change that immediately affects the subject’s bodily 
abilities and, in a mediated way, affects their mental capacities.10 We need 
to clarify the ways human nature can in principle be changed through 
science, state whether the changes are temporary or permanent, and if 
permanent whether they only concern one individual or his or her off-
spring as well.
Now, it is extremely difficult to develop a clear-cut taxonomy of 
possible types of changes to human nature because, for any suggested 
taxonomy, there are many borderline cases and counterexamples. Nev-
ertheless, I distinguish roughly between internal and external changes to 
human nature. On the one hand, internal changes to human nature con-
cern all the changes that take place exclusively on the level of the organic 
constitution, or inside, the organism in question. Biotechnologies such 
as genetic engineering, nanotechnology, and pharmacology provide the 
means to change human nature internally by changing its biochemical 
functioning. External changes to human nature, on the other hand, are all 
the purpose of this paper I also bracket the question that arises in cases where it is not clear 
based on an external observation whether there is a human subject as specified related to a 
body at all. 
9That is to say, the transhumanist thesis is consistent with the denial that we should 
be transformed in ways that make us unable to be moral agents. I am grateful to Mark C. 
Murphy for pointing this out to me. 
10Cf. Hopkins, “A Moral Vision for Transhumanism,” 4: “The first element of a transhu-
manist moral vision is that the effort to address the human condition requires that we change 
the physical facts that in part generate the human condition. Curing the human condition 
requires altering the ‘human’ part of the equation.”
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those technical extensions of the body or technical replacements of parts 
of the body.11 Cybernetics, with its human-machine-interfaces and pros-
thetic replacement of the extremities of a human body, most obviously 
belongs to this kind of change to human nature.
As a matter of technological fact, external changes to the biological 
nature of a human being, whether they are essential or contingent for 
the survival of the organism, are in principle restricted to an individual’s 
embodiment and cannot be inherited. They are either temporary or per-
manent only in respect to the life span of an individual because they are 
technical extensions to, or replacements of, bodily parts that leave the 
individual’s genetic constitution untouched. In contrast, some internal 
changes to human nature, whether they are essential or contingent for 
the survival of the organism, are permanent and can be inherited. For in-
stance, if we genetically change the germ line of a human individual, then 
this will involve changes in the gametes, which means the changes are 
transmissible via reproduction to the next generation.
As a moral demand to make use of applied science, transhumanism is 
committed to authorizing both external and internal changes of human 
nature. If the moral imperative is to change human nature through the 
use of applied science, then, within the limit specified, it is hard to find a 
reason to exclude a particular type of change to human nature. Further-
more, it seems that transhumanism should ensure that the changes are 
permanent, if possible, if only for the pragmatic reason of not having to 
repeat the same procedure over and over again for any future individual. 
As Harris argues, “If the change is important enough to make in the indi-
vidual, then, if it can be made on the germ line and passed on indefinitely 
to future generations, that simply avoids the necessity of a separate altera-
tion to each and every future generation.”12
I.4 Quantitative and Qualitative Enhancements of Human Bodies
Since I assume that the transhumanist does not want to change human 
nature in order to debase the situation of currently living or future in-
dividuals—this would itself be morally wrong and thus contradict the 
transhumanist’s moral motivation—there remain prima facie two possible 
intentions in changing human nature: therapy and enhancement. The idea 
is that the use of biotechnology is therapeutic if and only if it helps the 
individual overcome some internal or external limitations that prohibit 
its normal functioning as a member of its species—the traditional under-
standing of medicine is one of therapy—whereas an enhancement is said 
to be something that lifts the individual to a higher level than normal. This 
distinction, however, is hard to justify.
First, apart from clear cases according to which human bodies normally 
possess those features and functions that we colloquially associate with a 
11Cf. Kass, Beyond Therapy, 14.
12Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 40. 
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healthy human being—five senses, two legs, two arms etc.—it is extremely 
difficult to specify a standard of normality that we could deploy and take 
as a measure to distinguish between normal and non-normal features of 
the body of a human subject and the normal and non-normal functioning 
of an individual’s physical and mental capacities. Second, both therapeutic 
and enhancing interventions are based on the same motivation to help 
and benefit a particular organism and the related human subject.13
Although the goal of transhumanism, then, is to enhance human nature, 
there is seldom reflection on what precisely an enhancement of human 
nature could be. There is no disagreement that, conceptually, enhance-
ment is good; there is just no agreement on what precisely enhancement 
of human nature is. For this reason, disagreement occurs when it comes to 
the following question: “Which change to an individual human nature is 
an enhancement for that individual?”14
To answer this question, it is useful to distinguish between qualitative 
and quantitative intentions to enhance human nature. The quantitative 
way to enhance human nature presupposes objective measuring scales 
for current human abilities that determine their corresponding efficacy, 
where a higher value on that scale is better than a lower one. We can run 
that fast; we can reach such and such an IQ; our immune system is able 
to deal with such and such situations; we are able to live that long, etc. In 
principle, quantitative enhancements intend to improve the quantity of 
known human abilities in order to enable them to reach a higher score on 
a corresponding measuring scale of physical and mental abilities that are 
judged to be good to have for human subjects. The idea is that it is good 
to be smarter, to be able to run faster, to be able to smoke without the fear 
of cancer, etc.
Qualitative enhancements, by contrast, are concerned with changes in 
human nature that enable human subjects to do things with their bodies 
or minds formerly impossible for them to engage in. Here we often enter 
the realm where transhumanism meets science fiction. One could imagine 
creating human individuals who can breathe and live under water or 
human subjects with wings on their back that enable them to fly. The 
questions include asking what precisely the advantage of such a changed 
human nature would consist in and whether there is an objective answer 
to that question at all.
The distinction between quantitative and qualitative enhancements of 
human nature leads to two different theses of transhumanism that differ 
13As Harris says, “the distinction between therapy and enhancement, between protection 
and improvement, cannot be coherently or consistently maintained. . . . The overwhelming 
moral imperative for both therapy and enhancement is to prevent harm and confer benefit. 
Bathed in that moral light, it is unimportant whether the protection or benefit conferred is 
classified as enhancement or improvement, protection or therapy” (Harris, Enhancing Evolu-
tion, 57–58).
14Cf. Blackford, “Trite Truths about Technology,” 176–177, and Harris, Enhancing Evolu-
tion, 185.
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in respect to their consequences of transforming homo sapiens into another 
or into many new species. What I term moderate transhumanism endorses 
quantitative enhancements that will not lead to the development of a new 
species, whereas radical transhumanism supports qualitative enhancements 
that might well do so because the resulting subjects might, as a matter of 
biological fact, no longer be able to procreate and breed fertile offspring. 
Because of the difficulty of specifying which qualitative change to human 
nature could be addressed as an enhancement of human nature I will con-
centrate on moderate transhumanism.
I.5 A Thesis of Moderate Transhumanism
According to the moderate transhumanist agenda, it is morally valuable 
to enhance the human nature of individual subjects, externally and inter-
nally, and where it is possible permanently, through the use of applied 
science, in order to increase their range of human physical and mental 
capacities with respect to an objective scale of measurement of physical 
and mental abilities that are judged to be good for human subjects to have. 
Transhumanism has to respect and ensure that no enhancement, whether 
internal or external, whether permanent or temporary, conflicts with the 
character of human beings as free and autonomous moral agents.
II. A Christian Evaluation of Moderate Transhumanism
Before turning to distinctively Christian considerations, let me briefly 
analyse some popular secular arguments against transhumanism, often 
deployed by Christians in addition to their own arguments. In a secular 
context, transhumanism is criticized for reasons that belong to one or 
more of these categories: technological, social, and individual.
The category of technological problems contains two types of argument. 
According to the first type of argument, the transhumanist agenda is in 
principle futile and bound to fail due to its overestimation of the progress 
of scientific knowledge and technology. Contrary to transhumanist opti-
mism regarding the progress of the sciences, and irrespective of whether 
we should enhance human nature if we could, the transhumanist agenda 
fails because we do not know and probably never will know, how to quan-
titatively enhance human nature. As Tirosh-Samuelson15 says, “At present, 
we do not even know what it means to have a thought, and therefore the 
transhumanist vision of . . . [enhancing] our personality should not be 
taken too seriously.”16
According to the second type of technological argument, transhu-
manism has to be rejected because of its apparently inappropriate stance 
on the perhaps unintended consequences and the possible misuse of the 
application of new technologies. On the one hand, we do not know enough 
about the possible consequences of applying these new technologies and, 
15Tirosh-Samuelson, “Engaging Transhumanism,” 32.
16Cf. also Peters, “Transhumanism and the Posthuman Future,” 147.
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therefore, as a matter of prudence, should not enhance human nature even 
if we could. As it were, the way to hell is paved with good intentions. On 
the other, it is argued that technologies can always be used in a dual way: 
If we know how to enhance a certain human trait, then we will also know 
how to destroy it. The possibility of genocide is of technological necessity 
entailed by the possibility of enhancement. Therefore, since we cannot ex-
clude the possibility of genocide once the technology is there, we should 
not endorse transhumanism.
According to social arguments against it, transhumanism might lead to 
morally unacceptable social consequences. For example, the possibility of 
enhancing human nature, once it reaches a level that we can successfully 
handle, will inevitably lead to social injustice and pressure. In a capitalist 
world, not everyone will be able to pay for the enhancement of his or her 
human nature, or of the enhancement of his or her offspring. Since most 
likely those with an enhanced human nature will benefit from it as far as 
their career is concerned, we should not enhance human nature, in order 
to avoid this kind of social injustice.
The third category of argument against moderate transhumanism 
concerns problems potentially arising about the moral or psychological 
status of the enhanced individuals. Those enhanced will feel like an ob-
ject created to fulfil the purpose for which they were enhanced, and, it is 
argued, it is morally forbidden to use the biological nature of a human 
subject as a means to an end. As Habermas argues, “We cannot rule out 
that knowledge of one’s own hereditary features as programmed may 
prove to restrict the choice of an individual’s life, and to undermine the es-
sentially symmetrical relations between free and equal human beings.”17 
Therefore, because we cannot exclude this consequence, we should not 
permit a transhumanist enhancement of human nature.
Although often encountered in the discussion of transhumanism, 
none of the arguments is ultimately convincing. Technological arguments 
against transhumanism, which presuppose that as a matter of principle 
the transhumanist agenda will fail due to limitations concerning our 
scientific knowledge or abilities, are hard to justify. The reason is that 
none of us knows precisely how science will develop. Given the almost 
exponential growth of scientific knowledge in the last century, however, 
it is pessimistic to claim that we will not be able to obtain knowledge to 
bring about moderate human enhancements. Even if we will not be able 
to quantitatively enhance human nature, this does not conflict with the 
transhumanist attempts to try to enhance it for the benefit of the indi-
viduals involved.
As regards risk and misuse, no reasonable transhumanist will deny 
that there are risks that we have to take into account, nor will deny that 
technology can always be used for good and bad purposes.18 As Blackford 
17Habermas, The Future of Human Nature, 23.
18Cf. Walker, “Ship of Fools,” 101, and Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 33–34.
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states, “Future technologies will sometimes be used for spiteful or ma-
levolent purposes and will typically be used for self-interested ones.”19 
This, however, is not a problem intrinsic to transhumanism. We could 
only avoid the possible misuse and the risk attached to the application of 
scientific results if we abandoned research altogether.
The social problems, too, are not terribly damaging to the transhumanist 
agenda. As far as social justice and pressure are concerned, it is of course 
true that transhumanism might lead to the problems discussed. The prob-
lems of social injustice in the distribution of common goods are general to 
societies, independent of the transhumanist agenda of enhancing human 
nature. Transhumanism does not bring this problem into the world. Trans-
humanism, if successful, only provides a new way in which this problem 
becomes visible and urgent. Enhancing human nature will be a good in 
addition to all the other goods like education, housing, nurturing, and 
so on, and no morally responsible transhumanist will deny that we will 
have to find a solution to problems of social injustice, independently of 
the question of enhancing human nature.20 In general, as Harris argues, 
“Fairness . . . does not require that benefits should not be provided to any 
until they can be made available to all.”21
The worry that enhanced future individuals will feel as if they are 
treated as a mere means to an end is an empirical question independent 
of the question of whether the biological nature of a human subject is en-
hanced or not, and therefore has no normative impact on the question of 
the legitimation of moderate transhumanism. We are born either with a 
genetic makeup that to some extent is random and depends on our par-
ents, the personal interests of whom already influence our genome and 
our very existence, or we are born with a particularly designed genome 
that enables us to be good in certain ways. It seems plausible that in both 
cases it is possible that a future individual will question their purpose and 
existence in the world. This possibility of critical reflection belongs to the 
very mode of existence of freely acting and embodied human subjects. 
For instance, to me it would not make the slightest difference if I knew 
that my genome was enhanced in order to be good at X. If I simply did 
not enjoy doing X, then I would not actualise my disposition. If there is a 
problem here, then, it is rather a problem for society if people or parents 
try to pressure enhanced individuals in a certain direction. This problem 
exists independently of transhumanism, and we can already see it at work 
in societies where parents force their offspring to do this or that, even 
contrary to their will.
I conclude that there is no decisive secular argument against moderate 
transhumanism on which the Christian could rely.
19Blackford, “Trite Truths about Technology,” 183.
20Cf. Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 27–28.
21Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 27–29.
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II.1 Christian Arguments against Transhumanism
Even if there is no convincing secular argument against transhumanism, 
there might be good arguments from Christian faith against the agenda 
of enhancing human nature. From a Christian point of view, we want to 
know (1) whether this agenda contradicts essential features of a Christian 
worldview and therefore has to be rejected, (2) whether it is consistent 
with the essentials of Christian faith and therefore could be endorsed, or 
(3) whether it is supported by the fundamentals of Christian morality and 
therefore should be authorized.22
Although transhumanism is “regarded by many leaders and theolo-
gians as hubristic, or otherwise morally impermissible, and fair (perhaps 
even urgent) target . . . for political suppression,”23 it is difficult to find a 
convincing Christian argument against moderate transhumanism.24
Typically, it is argued that transhumanism is in conflict with one or 
more of the following features of the Christian worldview: (1) the divinely 
bestowed normative status of human nature, (2) the human dignity di-
vinely attached to human nature, or (3) the fact that Jesus Christ adopted 
human nature.
First, it is assumed that God created human nature “as it is” and that, 
as a consequence, it has a normative status that is morally relevant. It 
is then argued that it is morally forbidden to change human nature. As 
Cameron and DeBaets argue, “It is plain that all efforts at the enhance-
ment of human nature . . . are theologically excluded since they have the 
effect of reshaping that human nature that is both God given and God 
taken.”25 In other words, “Only God has both the authority and ability to 
form and change us. Altering human physical form is taking on a role that 
human beings do not possess and should not usurp. Human beings are 
to enjoy and work within the God-given design of the world as we have 
received it.”26
With respect to human dignity, it is argued that current human nature 
possesses God-given dignity, a dignity that it would lose if we enhanced 
22The following analysis, thus, is not engaged in from the point of view of a particular 
Christian tradition and consequently does not suppose that it speaks with any authority for 
a particular Christian tradition. The aim is rather to analyse the options in principle available 
to those of Christian faith that should be taken theologically seriously. Cf. Peters, Aguilar-
Cordova, Crawford, and Karen, “Religious Traditions and Genetic Enhancement,” 109–159, 
for an analysis of the different positions of Christian denominations in respect to genetic 
enhancement.
23Blackford, “Trite Truths about Technology,” 179.
24Some theologians have been critical of transhumanism, cf. Waters, From Human to Post-
human. Others share a more optimistic view, cf. Hefner, Technology and Human Becoming, 
Hefner, “The Animal that Aspires to Be an Angel,” 158–167, Peters, Playing God?, and Peters, 
For the Love of Children.
25Cameron and DeBaets, “Germline Gene Modification,” 105. See also Stob, “Christian 
Ethics and Scientific Control,” 20: “To tamper with the genes seems to me to ‘outrun’ God 
into an unknown future and to exercise an ‘elective’ discrimination mere men do not pos-
sess.”
26Peterson, Changing Human Nature, 86.
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it. As Tada and Cameron argue, “God made us in his image, weak and 
strong, those with genes that make life easy and those with genes that can 
make life very hard. Our task is to treat every human being as someone 
worthy of the dignity God has granted each of us. . . . ‘Designed’ humans 
are still humans; but to the extent that they result from someone’s plan-
ning, their human dignity is compromised.”27
Third, it is argued that human nature has a normative status that is 
morally relevant because Jesus Christ adopted human nature in the incar-
nation. As Cameron and DeBaets state the point, “The exemplar of homo 
sapiens is the glorified Jesus Christ, and he it is who will return to be our 
judge. His bearing our humanness sets the standard of all excellences in 
time and space. . . . Every effort at the enhancement of our human nature 
as such is doomed to failure. The only way for humans to rise above the 
givenness of their human station must be illusory; the way up leads as it 
were, only down.”28 Therefore, “strictly speaking, according to this view 
there can be no such thing as genetic enhancement, because every genetic 
change is a move away from God’s intent.”29
Although some of the arguments derive naturally from particular 
Christian worldviews and their traditions, none of the arguments as such 
is a necessary theological consequence of the essential features of Chris-
tian faith in general, which is to say that the denial of their respective 
conclusion is consistent with Christian faith. It even has the resources to 
support a moderate transhumanist agenda.
Arguments according to which the enhancement of human nature con-
flicts with the divinely bestowed normative status of human nature are 
not convincing. Most Christian denominations today are happy to accept 
that the species homo sapiens developed through an evolutionary process. 
Evolutionary theory, if not understood within a materialist framework, is 
entirely consistent with Christian faith. If, however, Christians accept the 
theory of evolution, then they accept that, used in a biological context, 
the term “human nature” does not refer to a fixed essence, because in the 
long-run of evolution our genetic constitution is constantly changing due 
to natural or cultural influences. As Caplan argues,
27Tada and Cameron, How to be a Christian in a Brave New World, 80, 202. As Bostrom 
argues, “one of the central concerns of the bioconservatives is that human enhancement tech-
nologies might be ‘dehumanizing.’ The worry, which has been variously expressed, is that 
these technologies might undermine our human dignity or inadvertently erode something 
that is deeply valuable about being human. . . . In some cases . . . the unease seems to derive 
from religious or cryptoreligious sentiments” (“In Defense of Posthuman Dignity,” 56).
28Cameron and DeBaets, “Germline Gene Modification,” 105. Cf. also 113: “General con-
cerns about exercising design power over future generations are restated dramatically in 
the context of Christian theology, specifically the Christian view of human nature and of 
our Lord’s having taken that nature to himself. It is supremely in the incarnation that we 
see what it means to be human, and the human nature of Jesus has been taken into the very 
godhead, unchanging until the eschatological consummation but ready to return at the ap-
pointed time with glory.”
29Cole-Tuner, “Religion, Genetics, and the Future,” 215.
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is there a ‘nature’ that is common to all humans, both those that exist now 
and that have existed in the past? The fight over whether there is any such 
thing as a human nature is a long-standing one. . . . But one can concede that 
we have been shaped by a causally powerful set of genetic influences and 
selection forces and still remain skeptical as to whether these have produced 
a single ‘nature’ that all members of humanity possess. . . . If one surveys all 
humans, across cultures, those of all ages and varieties of congenital defects, 
and those from different times in the past it becomes hard to believe any 
single trait is defining of human nature.30
If this is the case, though, then God never created a particular biological 
type of human nature that of necessity is common to all human beings. 
From an evolutionary point of view, the concept of human nature there-
fore is a cluster concept that entails biological variations exhibited by the 
members of the species homo sapiens. Consequently, even if it matters to 
God that somebody belongs to the species homo sapiens, this does not entail 
that this person has to have a specific genome; all that matters is that this 
genome is one of the multiple variations that belong to the species homo 
sapiens. Therefore, there is no theological reason why, in the context of 
moderate transhumanism, we should not quantitatively enhance features 
that belong to human nature thus understood. Homo sapiens is already 
consistent with a variation of different features and traits, and moderate 
transhumanism only intends to bring about the best possible realization of 
these features without crossing the border of the species.
Arguments from the dignity of human life confuse the moral status 
of human subjects with the biological body or genome. The moral status 
of human subjects consists in the fact that they experience themselves as 
freely acting, moral, and embodied subjects of a stream of consciousness. 
This is what constitutes absolute human dignity. It is not a particular 
biological body or genome to which a person’s dignity is related, and as-
suming so is ethically absurd.
In the same way, the incarnation was not an apotheosis of the specific 
biological human nature of Jesus of Nazareth. If one argues that because, 
as a matter of fact, the Son became incarnate in a particular biological 
human nature, we should not want to fail to share that biological nature, 
one confuses the issue by confusing the biological and the soteriological 
aspect of the incarnation. The incarnation does not entail an apotheosis of 
a specific biological human nature (say, a particular Aramaic genome). It 
is concerned with the forgiving of our sins.
From a soteriological point of view, Jesus Christ was both fully human 
and fully divine because there is no other way for him to forgive our sins 
and to reconcile humanity with God. To be fully human at least entails 
30Caplan, “Good, Better, or Best?,” 202. The difficulty to agree on a biological definition 
of human nature is due to the fact that “species are not static collections of organisms that 
can be ‘preserved’ against change like a can of fruit; they wax and wane with every birth 
and death and their genetic complexions shift across time and space” (Juengst, “What’s Tax-
onomy Got to Do with It?,” 50).
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two implications: to be a freely acting subject of experience and to possess 
a biological human nature that belongs to the species homo sapiens.
First, it seems plausible to assume that the most important feature that 
is relevant to God and justifies our being created in the image of God, 
is the fact that Christ was an embodied subject of experience who could 
respond to or decide against the grace and love of God.
Second, since we know that from an evolutionary point of view, “human 
nature” refers to a cluster of biological traits constitutive of homo sapiens, 
it follows that the specific biological human nature of Jesus of Nazareth 
cannot be soteriologically relevant. If it was, then Christ could have only 
redeemed those human beings with precisely the same specific biological 
human nature—but apart from Jesus of Nazareth there does not seem to 
be a second individual sharing his genome.
It is therefore accidental to the incarnation that Jesus of Nazareth had 
a particular genome.31 What is relevant is that Christ’s biological human 
nature was an exemplar of homo sapiens and belonged to the species homo 
sapiens, which in itself is open to a variation of different biological traits 
and features. Since the moderate transhumanist agenda does not intend 
to change homo sapiens in a way that results in a new species, but only 
intends to enhance homo sapiens, and since moderate transhumanism does 
not intend to change the fact that human beings are freely acting subjects 
of experience, I conclude that there is no convincing Christian argument 
against the quantitative enhancement of features that are good for human 
subjects. A Christian worldview can accept the moderate transhumanist 
agenda.
II.2 Christian Arguments for Transhumanism
There is no convincing argument against the transhumanist agenda of 
quantitatively enhancing human nature. We can, though, present two 
theological arguments according to which Christians should fully autho-
rize the transhumanist agenda of enhancing human nature.
The first argument is based on the ontological status that God has be-
stowed on human beings and their relation to nature in general. Three 
possible interpretations of this relation are encountered in the discussion: 
domination, stewardship, and co-creation.32 For several reasons, the theo-
logically most attractive interpretation of the ontological status of human 
31It is interesting that in the context of exotheology, that is, the branch of theology dealing 
with questions concerning the existence of extraterrestrial life and their relevance for God’s 
revelation, similar arguments are considered. In exotheology, it is sometimes argued that the 
Incarnation is relevant for all freely acting and moral subjects that can respond to, or decide 
against the grace and love of God, independent of their embodiment. I am grateful to Mark 
Murphy for his comments on an earlier version of this argument.
32Cf. Coady, “Playing God,” 157: “[There are] three traditions of response to the relation-
ship between human beings and the natural order: The governing images associated with 
these are: domination, stewardship, and co-creation. The first two have been prominent in 
debates about the role of Christianity in promoting what many have seen as bad attitudes to 
the natural environment.”
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beings and of their relation to nature is that of co-creation. Domination is 
often understood as a strange legitimation of the exploitation of natural 
resources, which I cannot imagine God to have intended. Stewardship 
reminds one of an uninterested bureaucratic administration of nature 
and therefore runs contrary to the necessary existential entanglement 
of human beings in the natural order. The cultural and technological 
achievements of human beings strongly indicate that our relation to na-
ture has always been more than brute domination or administration.33 The 
assumption that human beings are co-creators and masters over nature is 
supported by Scripture itself. For instance, according to Genesis 1:26–28, 
God created human beings in his own image and (because he) ordered 
them to be masters over “the fish of the sea, the birds of heaven, the cattle, 
all the wild animals and all the creatures that creep along the ground” 
(New Jerusalem Bible). We are supposed to “be fruitful, multiply, fill the 
earth and subdue it” (Gen. 1:28 NJB). Furthermore, according to Psalm 8, 
God created human beings “little less than a god, crowned . . . with glory 
and honour” (Ps. 8:5 New American Bible). He has given us “rule over the 
works of [His] hands, put all things at [our] feet” (Ps. 8:6 NAB).
Based on the assumption that human beings are co-creators who 
take care of God’s creation, it follows that, according to the standards of 
Christian morality, Christians should be virtuous and good co-creators. 
Virtuous and good co-creators act to foster the well-being of creation by 
enhancing the present conditions of all creatures in accordance with the 
values of Christian morality. Since the human body belongs to the created 
order itself, it follows that if human beings have the knowledge and the 
ability to enhance human nature, that is, to foster the well-being of human 
subjects, they ought to do it. Therefore, as long as the object of enhance-
ment is a particular biological realization of human subjects and not the 
metaphysical feature of human subjects that justifies addressing them as 
being created in the image of God, Christians should endorse the agenda 
of moderate transhumanism.
The second Christian argument in favor of transhumanism is inde-
pendent of the question of the ontological status of human beings. It is 
based solely on plausible assumptions concerning the duties of morally 
acting agents and their compassion towards nature. The argument from 
compassion runs as follows: If there is a moral, able, and knowing being 
who can prevent unnecessary suffering in sentient beings and benefit 
sentient beings by enhancing their physical and mental capacities and 
33Cf. Hefner, “The Animal that Aspires to Be an Angel,” 163: “This biocultural human 
nature has prompted me to construct the idea of humans as God’s created co-creator as a 
way of interpreting both my experience of human nature and my evolutionary scientific un-
derstanding of Homo sapiens. I consider these evolutionary processes to be the way in which 
the created co-creator has come into being. Technology also is to be understood as having its 
source in this basic human nature.” Cf. also Coady, “Playing God,” 159: “In particular, the 
astonishing achievements of human creativity in medicine, transport, architecture, labour-
saving, and communications seems to be inconsistent with the picture of human beings as 
mere stewards and caretakers of what is given by God.”
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dispositions, then this being is morally committed to prevent unneces-
sary suffering in those beings and to benefit them when possible. Now, 
human beings are moral agents who will soon have enough knowledge 
to prevent unnecessary suffering and benefit other sentient beings by en-
hancing their physical and mental capacities and dispositions. Therefore, 
human beings are morally committed to preventing unnecessary suffering 
in sentient beings, and benefit them as well. To prevent unnecessary suf-
fering and benefit sentient beings by way of enhancing their physical and 
mental capacities and dispositions, however, is precisely the agenda of 
moderate transhumanism. Therefore, either it is a mistake to suppose that 
we ought to be compassionate and prevent suffering where we can, or 
else it follows that Christians are morally obliged to endorse the moderate 
transhumanist agenda.34
III. A Case Study: Immortal Christian Cyborgs
I would like to end with a brief analysis and theological assessment of a 
particular way of enhancing human nature. Because we have seen that 
Christians should authorize the quantitative enhancement of human na-
ture, insofar as those capacities and dispositions are good for a human 
subject to have, it seems natural to use current and future biotechnologies 
to ensure that human subjects are disposed to have longer lives, even lives 
that continue for an indefinite life-span. The intuitive idea behind this is 
that it is good for a moral agent to live, and we should use all available 
technologies to ensure that no human subject has to die as a consequence 
of having a body that is no longer able to deal with disease and adverse 
environmental influences. Christians, according to this idea, should try to 
turn themselves into what could be referred to colloquially as “immortal 
Christian cyborgs.”
In principle, there are two kinds of cyborg. The first kind of cyborg 
is a living biological body that, internally and externally, is enhanced 
through the use of applied science to increase its resistance to diseases 
and its ability to continue as a functioning body, without a decrease of its 
biological integrity, for an indefinite span of life, given appropriate envi-
ronmental conditions.35 The second kind of cyborg transcends the realm of 
the biological entirely and transfers human consciousness into the realm 
of virtual reality by creating a mind-clone of the subject in question.36 Since 
the latter kind of cyborg presupposes a radical transhumanist agenda, and 
since I restricted myself to the evaluation of moderate transhumanism, I 
bracket the discussion of virtual humans who exist in the realm of virtual 
machines.
34As Engelhardt says, “although traditional Christianity has concerns that limit and direct 
human genetic engineering, concerns that it does not share with the secular culture, these 
do not create a categorical prohibition in principle against such technology” (“A Traditional 
Christian Reflection on Reengineering Human Nature,” 86).
35Cf., for instance, Dinello, Technophobia!
36Cf., for instance, Rothblatt, Virtually Human.
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Now, whereas one might argue that it is a legitimate Christian agenda 
to enhance the mental and physical capacities of embodied human sub-
jects, one might feel uneasy when encountering the question of whether, 
from a Christian point of view, we should seek to extend our lives over 
and above their “natural” limits. This worry, however, is inappropriate; 
the accepted ways of enhancing human bodies most likely will lead to a 
longer life span of the enhanced bodies. People do not die because of old 
age, but because of diseases, and if we enhance the physical body of an in-
dividual in order to deal successfully with more diseases, humans might 
live vastly longer just because of this kind of enhancement.37 Therefore, 
because Christians ought to support the enhancement of human nature, 
they should also support the attempts to increase the life span of human 
individuals through the use of applied science.
Suppose, then, that human subjects have been successful in their at-
tempts to create a human body that has in principle a never-ending span 
of life. Although there are many social worries that accrue with respect 
to family structures, over-population and the like, the theologically 
interesting question is the following:38 Will we have fulfilled the dream of im-
mortality that is promised in Christian faith once our bodies are enhanced enough 
to live for an indefinite span of life?
The answer is quite clearly “No.” Although Christians fully enjoy being 
alive and, in normal circumstances, seek to lengthen their time in this world 
in order to do good and to recognize and respond to the grace of God, the 
transhumanist vision of what often is misleadingly called “immortality” is 
theologically irrelevant. First, even an enhanced human body that knows 
no natural death is not an invulnerable human body and can be killed or 
destroyed in numerous ways.39 Second, our universe has only a finite ex-
istence and, according to the second law of thermodynamics, is bound to 
come to a state in which life is impossible. As a matter of physical necessity, 
human subjects cannot lead an infinitely long life in this world. Third, from 
a Christian point of view it is not the duration of a particular human life that 
is important but the moral quality of the life led and the human individual’s 
response to the call of God. A short life can be morally exemplary, and a 
long or an indefinitely long life can be morally horrendous in the eyes of 
God. The duration of a human life is therefore eschatologically irrelevant.40
37Cf. De Grey, “SENS Statement of Principle,” 67: “Two thirds of all deaths worldwide, 
and about 90 percent of all deaths in the developed world, are from causes that only rarely 
kill young adults. These causes include Alzheimer’s, cardiovascular disease, type 2 diabetes, 
and most cancers. They are age-related because they are expressions of the later stages of 
aging, occurring when the molecular and cellular damage that has accumulated in the body 
throughout life exceeds the level that metabolism can tolerate. Moreover, before it kills them, 
again imposes on most elderly people a long period of debilitation and disease. For these 
reasons, aging is arguably the most prevalent medically relevant phenomenon in the modern 
world, and the primary ultimate target of biomedical research.”
38Cf. Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 64.
39Cf. Harris, Enhancing Evolution, 60.
40Cf. Peters, “Transhumanism and the Posthuman Future,” 161.
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The Christian hope for immortality is not to have a life in this world as 
long as possible, because the Christian fear is not for the death of the body. 
The kind of immortality we long for is not immortality that is opposed to 
the finite duration of a human life, but that which overcomes the frailty of 
our worldly existence. Our hope is to be resurrected in order to enjoy the 
beatific vision of God. An indefinitely long span of life, therefore, does not 
satisfy in the slightest the Christian hope for immortality in the presence 
of God. In this sense, even immortal Christian cyborgs should not forget 
the wisdom found in Hebrews: “There is no permanent city for us here; 
we are looking for the one which is yet to be” (Heb. 13:14 NJB).41
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